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References:  1)  NRC Letter from William 0. Long to M. L. Marchi,  "AMENDMENT NO.  142 
TO FACILITY OPERATING  LICENSE NO. DPR-43-KEWAUNEE 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (TAC NO. MA1557),"  dated December 2,  1998 
2)  NMC Letter from Kenneth  H. Weinhauer to NRC Document Control  Desk, 
"Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Reload Safety Evaluation Methods 
Topical Report WPSRSEM-NP, Revision 3,"  dated October  12, 2000 
Nuclear Management Company, LLC, (NMC) proposes to amend Kewaunee Nuclear Power 
Plant (KNPP) Facility Operating License DRP-43 by incorporating the attached changes into 
Technical  Specification  (TS) 3.10.m for Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow.  
NMC plans to replace existing Westinghouse Model 51  original steam generators  (OSG) with 
Westinghouse  Model 54F replacement steam generators (RSG) in the fall of 2001.  Plugging and 
repair of OSG tubes during their operating life has diminished flow-performance.  This reduction 
in performance required amendments  to TS 3.1 0.m from time to time in order to make Reactor 
Coolant Minimum Flow consistent with diminished flow.  Now that the OSGs are being 
replaced,  it is necessary to again amend TS 3. 10.m to return the minimum flow value to one 
appropriate for the new, non-repaired, RSGs.  The last amendment (Reference  1) to TS  3. 10.m 
reduced Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow to 85,500 gpm average flow per loop.  KNPP is now 
requesting NRC approval for return of Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow to a value of 93,000 gpm 
for the RSGs.  This value is 440 gpm greater flow than the original value for the OSGs when new 
of 92,560 gpm;  a slight difference in the conservative direction.  
Design transient analyses used as the bases for the Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow value 
proposed in this amendment request were calculated using RETRAN 3D in the 2D mode.  NRC 
permission for KNPP to use this methodology was requested (Reference  2)  and discussions 
contained herein assume approval of that request.  
In  accordance  with  10  CFR  50.90,  this  letter requests Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  (NRC) 
approval to change KNPP  TS 3.10.m to the new Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow value.  This TS 
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change is needed for operation with the RSGs and for Cycle 25  core design.  NMC asks that the 
NRC approve this amendment by September  1, 2001,  for implementation after unit shutdown for 
steam generator replacement and before commencement of dilution to reactor criticality.  
Nothing  in this  letter  should be  construed  to constitute  a commitment  or redefine  a margin  to 
safety unless specifically so stated in separate correspondence  or in safety analyses of record.  
In  accordance  with  10  CFR  50.30(b),  a  signed  and  notarized  affidavit  is  included  herewith.  
Additionally, NMC  has  transmitted  a copy  of this  license  amendment  request  to  the  State  of 
Wisconsin as required by 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1).  
If there  are  questions  regarding  this  amendment, please  contact  either Mr. Thomas  J.  Webb at 
(920) 388-8537  or me at (920) 755-7627.  
Sincerely, 
O  Mark E. Reddemann 
Site Vice President 
MTVN 
Attachments:  1.  Description of Change, Safety Evaluation,  Significant Hazards 
Determination, and Statement of Environmental Considerations 
2.  Summary of LOCA and Non-LOCA Safety Analyses  for KNPP Steam 
Generator Replacement 
3.  Current affected page, TS 3.10-10,  annotated with the change 
4.  Technical Specification page TS 3.10-10 as amended 
cc - US NRC Region III 
US NRC  Senior Resident Inspector 
Electric Division, PSCW 
Subscribed and Sworn to 
Be:  ýe MeThis*__  Day 
~otary Public,  State.,f/Wisconsin 
My Commission Expires: 
October-24, 2004
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Letter from M. E. Reddemann  (NMC) 
To 
Document Control Desk (NRC) 
Dated 
January  18,  2001 
Proposed Amendment 172 
Description of Proposed Changes 
Safety Evaluation 
Significant Hazards Determination 
Environmental Consideration
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Introduction 
Nuclear Management Company, LLC, (NMC) intends to replace the Kewaunee Nuclear Power 
Plant's (KNPP) Westinghouse Model 51  original steam generators  (OSG) with Westinghouse 
Model 54F replacement steam generators (RSG) in the fall of 2001.  
As a part of the KNPP Steam Generator In-Service-Inspection (ISI) Program, tubes in the KNPP 
steam generator were plugged or repaired during their operating life.  Tube plugging and repair 
caused diminished flow, which made it necessary to amend the Technical  Specification (TS) 
3.1 0.m for Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow to represent the lower flow.  Most recently, the NRC 
approved Amendment No.  142 (Reference  1) to decrease the TS value to 85,500 gallons per 
minute (gpm) average flow per loop.'  Now that new steam generators are being installed, it is 
again necessary to amend the TS to raise the value to one compatible with new steam generators.  
The Model 54F steam generators have been designed to retain the major design functions, 
thermal performance, and overall physical size of the Series 51.  This limits the effect of RSGs 
on the KNPP design and licensing basis and permits the replacement of steam generators  to be 
conducted within the limitations provided by Title  10 of the Code of Federal  Regulations, 
Section 50.59 (10  CFR 50.59), "Changes, Tests and Experiments." 
The most significant change in Model 54F steam generators, with respect to the Series 51  steam 
generators, is in the tube bundle.  Alloy 690 was selected for manufacture of Model 54F tubes 
because of its superior resistance to corrosion.  Since Alloy 690 has a lower heat transfer 
coefficient than the Alloy 600 used in the Model 51,  the replacement bundle has been sized to 
provide a larger heat transfer area than the original steam generators.  This larger tube bundle can 
produce the same steam pressure as the original tube bundle at a lower operating temperature  or 
can provide more tube-plugging margin under the same operating conditions.  It also provides 
the added benefit of increased reactor coolant flow.  
The original TS 3.10.m Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow value of 92,560 gpm for the OSGs was 
diminished to the current value of 85,500 gpm as a result of tube plugging and repair.  Since the 
RSGs offer greater total flow, the TS Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow value for the new 
machines was rounded to 93,000 gpm.  This value is slightly more conservative.  
Operation with the Model 54F steam generator installed as a component of the KNPP nuclear 
steam supply system was evaluated and analyzed with respect to all affected design basis 
transients and the results  are contained in the Licensing Report (Reference 2).  Since the reactor 
coolant flow characteristics  for the RSG closely approximate  those of the Series 51  OSG, no 
changes to accommodate  flow differences  are required.  Results of the evaluation and analysis of 
design basis accidents and transients demonstrate that the 93,000 gpm value for TS 3. 10.m 
Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow proposed in this amendment request remains bounded and 
causes no adverse affect on safety.  
NRC approval of this TS change is requested by September 1, 2001,  to support steam generator 
replacement and Cycle 25 reload changes to ensure consistency in reload design, safety analyses, 
and technical specification operating limits.  
'All  values of TS 3.1O.m "Reactor  Coolant Minimum Flow" are in gallons per minute average  flow per loop.  
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Description of Change to TS 3.10.m, "Reactor Coolant Flow" 
TS Section 3.10.m is being revised as follows: 
Paragraph  3.10.m. I is revised to say "...reactor coolant flow rate shall be > 93,000 
gallons per minute average per loop.  If reactor coolant flow rate is <  93,000 gallons per 
minute per loop, ..." 
Safety Evaluation for Proposed Change to TS 3.1 O.m 
The  RSG  has  been  designed  to  retain  the  major design  functions,  thermal  performance,  and 
overall  physical  size  of the  OSG.  This  limits  the  effect  of the  RSG  on  KNPP  design  and 
licensing  basis  and  permits  replacement  of steam  generators  to  be  accomplished  within  the 
limitations  provided  by  Title  10  of the  Code of Federal  Regulations,  Section  50.59  (10  CFR 
50.59), "Changes, Tests and Experiments." 
The change will not adversely  affect plant equipment important to safety.  Equipment important 
to safety will  continue  to perform  its  design  function.  Thus,  the  change  does  not  involve  an 
unreviewed  safety  question  and  current  design  basis  analyses  (Reference  2)  bound  its  effect.  
Attachment 3 contains a summary of results and a list of LOCA Non-LOCA safety evaluations.  
The original TS 3.10.m Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow  value for the OSG  was 92,560 gallons 
per minute average per loop, but has been reduced  over time to the current value of 85,500 gpm 
due to plugging and repair.  This amendment to TS 3.10.m increases  the specification for Reactor 
Coolant Minimum  Flow  from  85,500  gpm  to  93,000  gpm  for the  RSGs,  setting  it to  a  value 
similar  to  that  originally  licensed  for  the  OSGs.  All  current  KNPP  analyses  of record  are 
performed  assuming  a  Reactor  Coolant  Thermal  Design  Flow  (TDF)  lower  than  and  less 
conservative than the TS value of 93,000 gpm.  The results of these analyses bound results at the 
proposed TS Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow value.  
The TS Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow is a low flow limit that allows plant operation  at values 
of Reactor Coolant flow greater than the limit.  Because the proposed 93,000 gpm flow  is greater 
than  the  analyzed  value  used  as  input  for  the  safety  analyses,  the  proposed  Reactor  Coolant 
Minimum  Flow  value  is bounded  by the  safety  analyses.  For instance,  margins to  departure
from-nucleate-boiling-ratio  (DNBR)  limit  and  fuel  peak-centerline-temperature  (PCT)  safety 
limit during  transients  and  accidents  are  increased.  Thus,  the proposed value  for TS  3.10.m  is 
conservative,  conforms  to  existing  design  bases,  and does  not alter  the result of any bounding 
safety  analysis.  Since  the  design  basis  safety  analyses  for  Large  and  Small  Break  LOCA 
accidents  and non-LOCA accidents have been analyzed or evaluated for the RSGs (Reference 2) 
at TDF and bound the proposed TS 3.10.m value  for Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow, all safety 
analysis  acceptance  criteria  are satisfied at the proposed TS  3.10.m Reactor  Coolant  Minimum 
Flow.  Thus,  the  proposed  change  to the  value of Reactor  Coolant  Minimum  Flow  does  not 
involve an unreviewed safety question.  
Significant Hazards Determination for Proposed Change to TS 3.10.m 
Nuclear Management  Company, LLC, (NMC) reviewed the proposed change in accordance with 
provisions of 10 CFR 50.92 and determined  that it involves no significant hazards consideration 
(Reference  2).  The proposed change does not:
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1)  Involve  a significant  increase  in the probability or consequences  of an  accident previously 
evaluated.  
The  change  in  Reactor  Coolant  Minimum  Flow  value  for  TS  3.10.m  proposed  in  this 
amendment request is needed to reflect operating  characteristics of the new RSGs.  Accident 
analyses  affected  by  the  RSGs  have  each  been  evaluated  to  establish  that  there  is  no 
significant change in the documented  results (Attachment 3).  These evaluations have  shown 
that  the proposed  value  for  Reactor  Coolant  Minimum  Flow  is  bounded by  the  Thermal 
Design  Flow  value  used  in  the  analyses  and  provides  greater  margin  to  safety  analysis 
acceptance  criteria  (e.g.,  DNB).  All  safety  analysis acceptance  criteria  are  satisfied.  Since 
Reactor Coolant flow values  for the RSG conform to the design bases and are bounded by the 
existing  safety  analyses,  changing  the technical  specification  within  limits  of the bounding 
accident analyses will not cause an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.  
2)  Create  the possibility of a new  or different  kind of accident  from  any  accident  previously 
evaluated.  
The  proposed  change  is  fully  consistent  with  current  plant  design  bases  and  does  not 
adversely  affect  any  fission product barrier,  nor  does  it alter  the  safety  function  of safety 
related  systems,  structures,  and  components  depended  upon  for  accident  prevention  or 
mitigation.  Thus, it does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.  
3)  Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.  
The  proposed  change  does  not alter  the  manner  in which  Safety  Limits,  Limiting  Safety 
System Setpoints, or Limiting Conditions for Operation are determined.  It returns TS  3.1 O.m 
for Reactor Coolant Minimum Flow to  a value slightly higher, thus more conservative,  than 
the value  specified for the OSG when new.  It conforms to plant design bases,  is consistent 
with  current safety analyses,  and limits  actual  plant operation.  Analysis of the effect of the 
proposed  Reactor  Coolant  Minimum  Flow  limitation  on  LOCA  and  non-LOCA  transients 
determined that all  safety analysis acceptance  criteria are satisfied  at a TDF that bounds the 
revised  Reactor Coolant  Minimum  Flow and  all  KNPP  safety  requirements  continue  to  be 
met. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of 
safety.  
Environmental Considerations 
This proposed amendment involves a change to the Technical Specifications.  It does not modify 
any facility components located within the restricted  area, as defined in  10 CFR 20.  NMC has 
determined that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations  and no 
significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no 
significant increase in the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.  This 
proposed amendment accordingly meets the eligibility criteria for categorical  exclusion set forth 
in 10  CFR 51.22(c)(9).  Pursuant to  10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with this proposed amendment.
\\KNPP\VOL  I\GROUP\NUCLEAR\LICENSING\NRC  LETTERSTPAI72.DOCDocument Control Desk 
January  18, 2001 
Attachment  1, Page 4 
References: 
1.  NRC Letter from William 0. Long to M. L. Marchi, "AMENDMENT  NO. 142  TO 
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-43-KEWAUNEE  NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANT (TAC NO. MA1557),  dated December 2, 1998 
2.  Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Steam Generator Replacement  and Tavg Operating Window 
Program Licensing Report, November 2000, by Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC
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To 
Document Control Desk (NRC) 
Dated
January  18, 2001 
Proposed Amendment  172
Summary of LOCA and Non-LOCA Safety Analyses  for 
KNPP Steam Generator Replacement
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Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant 
Replacement  of Steam Generator Lower Assemblies 
and Modification of Steam Domes 
Safety Evaluation Summary:  Non - LOCA Accidents 
References: 
1.  SGR DCR2858Modl,  Folder III, Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) 
2.  SGR Licensing Report 
3.  NRC letter 00-082 from K.H.Weinhauer to document control desk submitting WPSC 
KNPP topical report WPSRSEM-NP, Rev. 3, entitled, "Reload Safety Evaluation Methods 
for Application to Kewaunee,"  dated October  12, 2000 
Introduction:  Operation of Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) Nuclear Steam Supply 
System (NSSS) with replacement steam generators  (RSG) was evaluated according to the criteria 
of 10CFR50.59. The effect of RSGs on KNPP design basis Non- Loss of Coolant Accident 
(Non- LOCA) safety analyses is summarized below. These safety analyses include the design 
basis accidents described in chapter  14 of the KNPP Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) 
and the high energy line break (HELB)  outside containment accident.  
KNPP will replace the original Westinghouse model 51  SGs with Westinghouse model  54F SGs.  
Descriptions and safety evaluations of the changes in design features, thermal hydraulic 
performance, and materials associated with the RSGs are provided in reference  1. Operation of 
the NSSS with the model 54F SGs will affect the steady state conditions and transient response 
of the KNPP NSSS.  Safety analyses for Non-LOCA accidents appropriately incorporate  all 
physical and operational changes associated with the RSGs.  
Design and safety aspects of operating with the RSGs are described in the SGR Licensing Report 
(reference 2).  Section 6.8 documents the Non-LOCA safety analyses and provides the technical 
basis for the conclusions of this safety evaluation.  
Description of Non - LOCA Safety Analysis Changes 
Due to the scope of the DCR 2858 Mod 1 change, Kewaunee plant has reanalyzed all Non
LOCA design basis accidents affected by the RSG using assumptions  consistent with RSG 
design and operating characteristics.
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The following areas of transient analysis were evaluated to determine the effect of on design 
basis transients of operating with the RSGs: 
"*  USAR Chapter  14 Non-LOCA design basis accidents 
"*  high energy line break and auxiliary building compartment thermal hydraulic analysis 
"*  containment integrity analysis for main steam line break accident 
"*  Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS)  analysis.  
This represents all KNPP non-LOCA design basis accidents.  
Westinghouse plant performance capability (PCWG) analyses (reference 2, section 2) provide 
the bases for RSG plant input assumptions.  
Safeguard systems'  design and function, plant setpoints, fuel design, bounding core physics 
safety parameters, reactor power, and reactor Tave program are not changing in the year of RSG 
implementation. This is to reduce the number of changes  due to DCR 2858 Modl and thereby 
simplify licensing changes. The overall strategy for RSG analyses is designed to support both 
first year RSG plant operation with minimal license and operational changes as well as potential 
future plant changes that are possible because  of the RSG design.  
Non LOCA Safety Analysis Methodology 
The RSG Non LOCA safety analyses apply the analysis methods described in WPS Topical 
Report WPS-RSEM-NP revision 3 (reference 3).  Changes in Analysis Methods for SGR are the 
subject of a Safety Evaluation Report (reference  1).  
Evaluation Summary 
A description of the KNPP design basis accidents by condition category, including design 
requirements, acceptance criteria, and the applicable design basis transient events, is provided in 
the Licensing Report for: 
Condition II, Incidents of Moderate  Frequency 
Transient Events Reanalyzed for SGR 
"*  Uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) withdrawal from sub-critical 
"*  Uncontrolled RCCA withdrawal at power 
"*  RCCA misalignment (dropped/static) 
"•  Chemical and volume control system malfunction 
"*  Startup of inactive reactor coolant loop 
"*  Feedwater system malfunction 
"•  Excessive load increase 
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"*  Partial loss of reactor coolant flow 
"*  Loss of external load 
"*  Loss of normal feedwater 
"*  Loss of AC power to plant auxiliaries 
Condition III, Infrequent Incidents 
Transient Events Reanalyzed  for SGR 
"*  Small Break LOCA 
"*  Small steam line break 
"*  Complete loss of reactor coolant flow 
"*  Volume control tank rupture 
Condition IV, Limiting Faults 
Transient Events Reanalysed for SGR 
"*  Large Break LOCA 
"*  Steam generator tube rupture 
"*  Main steam line break (MSLB) 
"*  Locked rotor 
"*  RCCA ejection 
"•  Fuel handling accident 
KNPP performed safety analyses of design basis Non LOCA accidents using assumptions 
appropriate for the RSG design and operating characteristics.  Results of the safety  analyses 
satisfy all applicable acceptance criteria.
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Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant 
Replacement  of Steam Generator Lower Assemblies 
and Modification of Steam Domes 
Safety Evaluation Summary:  Loss of Coolant Accidents Analysis 
References: 
1.  DCR 2858, Modification  Package  1, Design Description 
2.  USAR Sections - See Section 3.2 of the Design Description in DCR 2858, Modification 
Package 1 
3.  Technical Specifications - See Section 3.2 of the Design Description in DCR 2858, 
Modification Package  1 
4.  Westinghouse  Design Specification  414A03, Rev. 2 "Model  54F Replacement  Steam 
Generator - Complete Lower Assembly and Modified Upper Assembly" 
5.  Westinghouse  Certified Design Report WCAP- 15318,15319,15324,15374 
6.  Westinghouse  Final Thermal Hydraulic Report WNEP-9902 
7.  SGR Licensing Report (Westinghouse  Submittal Letter WPS-99-125) 
Introduction:  Operation of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) with the proposed steam 
generator modifications has been evaluated using the guidance of Title  10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations  (CFR), Section 50.59 (10  CFR 50.59) and has been determined  to not represent an 
unreviewed  safety question.  The following assessment is specific to the Small Break Loss of 
Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) and Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA).  
The SBLOCA and LBLOCA analyses and evaluations for the Kewaunee (WPS) replacement 
steam generator (RSG) and Tave  operating window program were performed using essentially the 
same analysis input assumptions as the existing analyses/evaluations in the USAR.  The main 
exceptions are the steam generator type, the incorporation of a Tave operating window; revised 
pressurizer and accumulator line data, and revised containment heat sink data.  The Model  54F 
steam generator, the Tave operating window, and revised pressurizer and accumulator line data 
were explicitly analyzed in the SBLOCA and LBLOCA analyses.  The revised containment heat 
sink data was explicitly analyzed in the LBLOCA analysis. The SBLOCA analysis does not 
model a containment pressure transient;  therefore, the revised containment heat sink data was not 
incorporated in the SBLOCA analysis.
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The prior analyses for SBLOCA and LBLOCA modeled  a Model 51  steam generator.  The prior 
LBLOCA analysis explicitly analyzed a steam generator tube plugging (SGTP) of 30-percent.  
This same SGTP had been evaluated for SBLOCA.  The new analyses for LBLOCA and 
SBLOCA have explicitly modeled a Model 54F steam generator at an SGTP of 24-percent.  This 
SGTP was determined to be the maximum possible SGTP consistent with the desired thermal 
design flow (TDF) of 89,000 gpm/loop.  
Previously, the SBLOCA and LBLOCA analyses modeled a single reactor coolant system (RCS) 
Tave of 562.0°F with a measurement uncertainty of± 4°F.  The new analyses explicitly modeled a 
Tave operating window of 554.1W  °￿_<  Tave ￿  575.3°F with a measurement uncertainty of± 4°F.  
The new analyses for SBLOCA and LBLOCA have also incorporated revised pressurizer surge 
line and accumulator line data pursuant to NSAL-98-004.  The revised piping data has been 
explicitly modeled in both the 
SBLOCA and LBLOCA analyses for the RSG and Tav  operating window program.  
Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC), supplied revised containment heat sink data in 
order to ensure that the minimum containment pressure  response was modeled in the LBLOCA 
analysis.  
Additionally, the SBLOCA and LBLOCA analyses reanalyzed two situations previously 
evaluated and presented in the USAR.  The SBLOCA and LBLOCA analyses both analyzed the 
impact of the transition from Siemens 14x14 Standard fuel to Siemens  14x14 Heavy fuel and 
determined there was no peak cladding temperature (PCT) penalty associated with the transition 
cycles.  The LBLOCA analysis also reanalyzed the impact of increasing the low power region 
power factor (PLow)  from 0.50 to 0.60 after  1500 MWD/MTU  of cycle burnup and again 
determined that there was no PCT penalty associated with the PLow increase.  
The SBLOCA and LBLOCA analyses and evaluations performed for the RSG and Tawe  operating 
window program yield results well within all established acceptance criteria.  
The following summarizes the results of the LOCA evaluations: 
Small Break LOCA 
The High Tavg, 4-inch equivalent diameter limiting case peak cladding temperature calculated 
for the KNPP Appendix K SBLOCA analysis for the Model 54F RSG is 843WF.  The analysis 
models a total peaking factor (FQ) of 2.50, a hot rod channel factor of 1.70, a hot assembly factor 
of 1.514. This result is below the acceptance criteria limit of 2200'F. The maximum local metal
water reaction is <1.0 percent, which is well below the embrittlement Acceptance  Criteria limit 
of 17 percent. The limiting total core metal-water reaction is <1.0 percent, which is below the 1.0 
percent limit, in accordance with the Acceptance Criteria. The cladding temperature transient is 
terminated at a time when the core geometry is still amenable to cooling. As a result, the core 
temperature will continue to drop and the ability to remove decay heat generated in the fuel for 
an extended period of time will be provided.
\\KNPP\VOLI\GROUP\NUCLEAR\LICENSING\NRC  LETTERS\PAI72.DOCDocument Control Desk 
January  18, 2001 
Attachment 2, Page 6 
Large Break LOCA 
The Low Tavg, Pumps Running limiting case peak cladding temperature calculated  for the 
KNPP Appendix K LBLOCA analysis for the Model 54F RSG is 2038°F. The analysis models a 
total peaking factor (FQ) of 2.35, a hot rod channel  factor of 1.70, a hot assembly factor of 1.514, 
and a low power/periphery  region factor (Plow) of 0.50. The peak cladding temperature occurs 
during reflood at approximately  124 seconds. This result is below the acceptance criteria limit of 
2200'F. The maximum local metal-water reaction is 6.58 percent, which is below the 
embrittlement Acceptance  Criteria limit of 17 percent. The limiting total core metal-water 
reaction is 0.006 percent, which is much less than the 1.0 percent limit, in accordance with the 
Acceptance Criteria. The cladding temperature transient is terminated at a time when the core 
geometry is still amenable to cooling. As a result, the core temperature will continue to drop and 
the ability to remove decay heat generated in the fuel for an extended period of time will be 
provided.  
Long Term LOCA Containment Response 
Results of this analysis show that the containment pressure remains less than the limit of 46 psig.  
The evaluation of the proposed modification concludes  that it will not result in potential 
unreviewed safety questions, as defined in 1OCF50.59,  since it does not increase the probability 
or occurrence in the consequences of an accident in the Kewaunee USAR.  Nor has any 
mechanism for an accident or malfunction, which has not been previously evaluated in the 
USAR, been identified.  Also, the change does not decrease the margin of safety as identified in 
the basis for any Technical Specification.  
Summary Determination  of Unreviewed  Safety Question  for All KNPP  LOCA  and  Non
LOCA Design Basis Accidents Performed in Conjunction with RSG 
Changes to KNPP safety analyses affected by RSG installation were reviewed as required by 
Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations,  §50.59 (10  CFR 50.59) and found to not represent an 
unreviewed safety question.
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1.  During  steady-state  power  operation,  reactor  coolant  flow  rate 
shall  be  Ž  e$tSB9,i  gallons  per  minute  average  per  loop.  
If  reactor  coolant  flow  rate  is  <  •&0t9iO  gallons  per 
minute  per  loop,  action  shall  be  taken  in  accordance  with 
TS  3.10.n.
2.  Compliance 
verifying 
escalation 
with  plant
with  this  flow  requirement  shall  be  demonstrated  by 
the  reactor  coolant  flow  during  initial  power 
following  each  REFUELING,  between  70% and  95% power 
parameters  as  constant  as  practical.
n.  DNBR  Parameters 
If,  during  power  operation  any  of  the  conditions  of  TS  3.10.k, 
TS  3.10.1,  or  TS  3.10.m.1  are  not  met,  restore  the  parameter  in 
2  hours  or less  to  within  limits  or  reduce  power  to  <  5% of  thermal 
rated  power  within  an  additional  6  hours.  Following  analysis, 
thermal  power  may  be  raised  not  to  exceed  a  power  level  analyzed  to 
maintain  a  DNBR  greater  than  the  minimum  DNBR  limit.  
Am-endent  No.  142  PA  172 
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m.  Reactor  Coolant  Flow 
I.  During  steady-state  power  operation,  reactor  coolant  flow  rate 
shall  be  Ž  93,000  gallons  per  minute  average  per  loop.  If 
reactor  coolant  flow  rate  is  <  93,000  gallons  per  minute  per 
loop,  action  shall  be  taken  in  accordance  with  TS  3.10.n.
2.  Compliance 
verifying 
escalation 
with  plant
with  this  flow  requirement  shall  be  demonstrated  by 
the  reactor  coolant  flow  during  initial  power 
following  each  REFUELING,  between  70% and  95% power 
parameters  as  constant  as  practical.
n.  DNBR  Parameters 
If,  during  power  operation  any  of  the  conditions  of  TS  3.10.k, 
TS  3.10.1,  or  TS  3.10.m.1  are  not  met,  restore  the  parameter  in 
2  hours  or  less  to  within  limits  or  reduce  power  to  < 5% of  thermal 
rated  power  within  an  additional  6  hours.  Following  analysis, 
thermal  power  may  be  raised  not  to  exceed  a  power  level  analyzed  to 
maintain  a  DNBR  greater  than  the  minimum  DNBR  limit.
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